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Towards Measuring Producer Welfare Under Output Price Uncertainty
and Risk Non-Neutrality
Introduction
There is extensive literature on evaluating welfare consequences of changes in agricultural
policies, prices, and technology.  Most of these studies have employed classical economic surplus
measures which are based on certain prices, to identify the welfare consequences of such changes
(e.g. Wallace, 1962; Cramer et al., 1990).  However, production lags and weather variability
cause agricultural producers typically to face uncertainty about output prices and production
when they make production decisions.  If producers respond to uncertain conditions (Sandmo,
1971), classical economic surplus measures are generally inappropriate (c.f. Just, 1975).  The
objective of this paper is to move the literature further toward a more appropriate measure.
Model, Notation, and Definitions
To facilitate communication, here we establish the notation and definition.  Our basic
model, notation, and definitions follow Pope, Chavas, and Just (PCJ, 1983), though our notation
is slightly less sparse in order to aid in explanation and illustration of methods we present.
Begin with the expected utility model developed by Baron (1970), Sandmo (1971), Batra
and Ullah (1974) and others.  The firm’s objective is to solve the maximization problem:
(1) max
x EU W + pf(x)− rx () γ { } ,
where E is an expectations operator, U is a function showing how utility depends on wealth, p is
an m-dimensional vector of output price variables, f(x) is a corresponding m-dimensional vector
of (nonjoint) production functions, r is an n-dimensional vector of input price variables, x is a
corresponding n-dimensional vector of input quantity variables, and W is a nonrandom and
exogenously determined wealth variable.  The price vectors p and r, and the vector of production2
functions f(x) may be assumed to consist of random or nonrandom variables, depending on the
case at hand.  All pertinent parameters are described by a vector γ  ∈  R
n
.  (We assume throughout
that this parameter vector has n elements.)  The moments of the distributions of the random
variables p, r, and f(x) in (1) are included as elements of γ , and therefore our notation explicitly
denotes that expectations depend on γ .  Initial wealth W is also an element of γ .
Firm inputs are assumed chosen optimally to solve (1), and therefore optimally chosen
input quantities x




The indirect risk premium function R
*(γ ) is implicitly defined by identity (3), and the
indirect certainty equivalent function L
*(γ ) is defined in (4):
(3)  UW+ E pf x
* γ () () − rx
* γ () γ {} − R
* γ () () ≡ EUW + pf x
* γ () () − rx
* γ () () γ      
      .
(4)  L
* γ () ≡ W + E pf x
* γ () () − rx
* γ () γ {} − R
* γ ( ) .
Substituting (4) into (3) yields,
(5) U L
* γ () () ≡ EUW + pf x
* γ () () − rx
* γ ()
π * γ ()























Note that in (5) we have provided the definition of the (uncompensated) profit function π
*(γ ).
Assuming U to be monotonically increasing, we can invert (5) to obtain
(6) L
* γ () ≡ U
− 1 EU W +π
* γ () () γ {} ( ) .
The risk premium function R
*(γ ) shows the maximum amount of cash that the firm would pay to
face the expected values of the random variables in γ  instead of facing the risk inherent in these3
random variables.  L
*(γ ) is the minimum amount of money the firm would have to receive with
probability one in order to keep the firm’s expected utility equal to the expected utility level
provided by the (possibly risky) markets parameterized by γ .
Let γ 1 denote a vector of model parameters in an initial situation, and γ 2 denote a vector of
model parameters in a subsequent situation.  One measure that can be used to examine the welfare
effect on the firm of a change in model parameters from γ 1 to γ 2 is simply the difference in the
indirect certainty equivalent functions:
(7) ∆ L
* γ 1,γ 2 () ≡ L
* γ 2 ()− L
* γ 1 ( ) .
Another measure that can be used to examine the welfare effect on the firm of a change in
model parameters from γ 1 to γ 2 is compensating variation, implicitly defined by identity (8):
(8) EUW+ pf x
* γ 1 () () − rx
* γ 1 () () γ 1
     
     
EU * γ 1 ()
￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
≡ EUW− c γ 1,γ 2 ,EU
* γ 1 () () [ { +
pf x
* γ 2 ,W − c γ 1,γ 2 ,EU
* γ 1 () () () ()
y c γ 1 ,γ 2 ,EU * γ 1 () () ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
− rx
* γ 2 ,W − c γ 1,γ 2 ,EU
* γ 1 () () ()
x c γ 1 ,γ 2 ,EU * γ 1 () () ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
π c γ 1,γ 2 ,EU * γ 1 () ()
￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ] γ 2
    .
Also defined in (8) are the compensated profit function π c(γ 1, γ 2, EU*(γ 1)), the vector of
compensated supply functions yc(γ 1, γ 2, EU*(γ 1)), and the vector of compensated input demand
functions, xc(γ 1, γ 2, EU*(γ 1)).
A Practical Procedure of Stochastic Producer Welfare Measurement
A Change in Three Parameters
We focus on three parameters: initial wealth W, the mean of an output price distribution
µ , and the standard deviation σ  of that same distribution.  (Procedures shown here can be4
generalized to examine the effects of changes in additional parameters.)  We desire to measure the
welfare impact of a change in these parameters from γ 1 = (W1, µ 1, σ 1) to γ 2 = (W2, µ 2, σ 2)
(notation for all other parameters is suppressed to save space).  Assume that the output price is
characterized by p = µ  + σε , where µ  and σ  are constants and ε  is a random variable with
expected value zero.  For a change in the parameters vector from γ 1 = (W1, µ 1,  σ 1) to γ 2 = (W2,
µ 2,  σ 2), the compensated profit function is
(9)π c W1,µ 1,σ 1 ()
γ 1 ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
;W 2 ,µ 2 ,σ 2 ()
γ 2 ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
;EU








  ≡ µ 2 +σ 2ε () yc γ 1,γ 2 ,EU
* γ 1 () () − rxc γ 1,γ 2 ,EU
* γ 1 () ( ) .
By combining the envelope theorem, the assumption that production is nonstochastic, and
the assumption that ε  has an expected value of zero, we have
(10a)
E
∂π c W1,µ 1,σ 1 ()
γ 1 ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
;W 2 ,µ 2 ,σ 2 ()
γ 2 ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
;EU





























≡ Ey c γ 1,γ 2 ,EU
* γ 1 () () γ 2 {} ≡ yc γ 1,γ 2 ,EU
* γ 1 () () .
(10b)E
∂π c W1,µ 1,σ 1 ()
γ 1 ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
;W 2 ,µ 2 ,σ 2 ()
γ 2 ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
;EU





























≡ E ε yc γ 1,γ 2 ,EU
* γ 1 () () γ 2 {} ≡ 0.5
(10c) E
∂π c W1,µ 1,σ 1 ()
γ 1 ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
;W 2 ,µ 2 ,σ 2 ()
γ 2 ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
;EU





























≡ E0 γ 2 {} ≡ 0.
Substituting (10) into (8) yields compensating variation,
(11)c W1,µ 1,σ 1 ()
γ 1 ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
;W 2 ,µ 2 ,σ 2 ()
γ 2 ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
;EU









(W, µ ,σ )= (W1 ,µ 1 ,σ 1 )






1⋅ dW + yc γ 1;W,µ ,σ ;EU
* γ 1 () () dµ +
cov ′  U W − c γ 1;W,µ ,σ ;EU
* γ 1 () () +π c γ 1;W,µ ,σ ;EU
* γ 1 () () () , ε ()
E ′  U W − c γ 1;W,µ ,σ ;EU
* γ 1 () () +π c γ 1;W,µ ,σ ;EU
* γ 1 () () () W, µ ,σ    











yc γ 1;W,µ ,σ ;EU






The Shutdown Price Assumption and Method
Clearly, a major hurdle in using (11) for empirical work is the third term of the integrand
on the right-hand side, the derivative of the compensating variation function with respect to σ ,
which generally cannot be derived from market data since the utility function U is not observable.




* γ 1 () () = max µ ∈ℜ :yc γ 1;W,µ ,σ ;EU
* γ 1 () () = 0 { } .
Since the line integral in (11) is path independent (see Kaplan, pp. 291 - 298), the path of
integration is an arbitrary one between endpoints γ 1 = (W1, µ 1, σ 1) and γ 2 = (W2, µ 2, σ 2).
Therefore we can elect to take a path which is the union of four subpaths.  The first subpath, S1, is
a line segment between points (W1, µ 1, σ 1) and  (W2, µ 1, σ 1).  That is, along S1, variable W6
changes from W1 to W2, while µ  and σ  stay constant at µ 1 and σ 1.  The other three subpaths are
illustrated in figure 1.  In figure 1 it is assumed that the firm is risk averse, so that given W2, as the
standard deviation σ  of the output price distribution rises, so does the maximum mean output
price at which the firm is willing to shut down.  (So, higher risk causes the vertical intercept of the
compensated supply curve, when graphed against mean output price µ , to shift up.)  S2 is the line
segment between point a =  (W2, µ 1, σ 1) and point b =  (W2, µ
*(W2, σ 1, EU
*(γ 1)), σ 1).  The third
subpath, labeled Sshutdown in figure 1, shows the locus of points (µ
*(W2, σ,  EU
*(γ 1)), σ ) for all σ  ∈
[σ 1, σ 2].  Sshutdown travels between points b =  (W2, µ
*(W2, σ 1, EU
*(γ 1)), σ 1)  and c =  (W2, µ
*(W2,
σ 2, EU
*(γ 1)), σ 2).  At all (µ , σ ) combinations on Sshutdown, compensated supply and profits are zero
since the firm is shut down.  The fourth subpath, labeled S4, is just the line segment between
point c =  (W2, µ
*(W2, σ 2, EU
*(γ 1)), σ 2) and point d =   (W2, µ 2, σ 2).
Letting S be the union of these four subpaths, clearly S is a path with endpoints γ 1 = (W1,
µ 1, σ 1) and γ 2 = (W2, µ 2, σ 2).  Since only parameter W changes along subpath S1, and only
parameter µ  changes along subpaths S3 and S4, and since only parameters µ  and σ  change along
Sshutdown the line integral on the right-hand side of (11) implies:
(13)cW 1,µ 1,σ 1;
γ 1 ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
W2 ,µ 2 ,σ 2
γ 2 ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
;EU






    ≡ 1⋅ dW
S1 ∫ + yc γ 1;W,µ ,σ ;EU








yc γ 1;W,µ ,σ ;EU
* γ 1 () ()
0
￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
dµ +
cov ′  U W − c+π c () , ε ()








  yc γ 1;W,µ ,σ ;EU
* γ 1 () ()
0






+ yc γ 1;W,µ ,σ ;EU
* γ 1 () () dµ



















W  , σ   ,   EU*(γ   )) 2 1
µ ( *
2
Figure 1.  Three subpaths of integration
As indicated in (13), anywhere along Sshutdown, compensated supply in zero.  Therefore the third
integral on the right-hand side of (13) is zero, and the difficult covariance term is dispensed.  The
other three line integrals are easily written as definite integrals, and we obtain:8
(14)cW 1,µ 1,σ 1
γ 1 ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
;W2 ,µ 2 ,σ 2
γ 2 ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
;EU












+ yc γ 1;W2 ,µ ,σ 1;EU
* γ 1 () ()
µ 1
µ * W 2 ,σ 1,EU * γ 1 () ()
∫ dµ
+ yc γ 1;W2 ,µ ,σ 2;EU
* γ 1 () ()
µ
* W2 ,σ 2 ,EU
* γ 1 () ()
µ 2
∫ dµ .
The expression in (14) indicates that if a shutdown price subpath of integration exists, the
change in stochastic producer welfare can be measured using the geometric areas behind two
compensated output supply curves. The first curve must be based on risk level σ 1 and wealth W2,
and the second curve must be based on risk level σ 2 and wealth W2.  Furthermore, the researcher
does not need complete knowledge of subpath Sshutdown to apply (14), but rather only needs to
know the values µ
*(W2, σ 1, E(γ 1)) and µ
*(W2, σ 2, E(γ 1)), the vertical intercepts of the
compensated supply curves.
A New Procedure Based on Vartia’s Method
Next we adapt Vartia’s (1983) method, which he used to approximate compensated demand from
the information in an uncompensated demand system, to approximate from information in an
uncompensated supply function the compensating variation for changes in the first and second
moments of the output price distribution.  This procedure has advantages over existing
procedures.  Unlike Pope, Chavas, and Just (1983), it does not impose any restriction on risk
preferences;  nor does it place bounds around classical surplus measures as do Pope and Chavas.
Unlike Larson (1988), the procedure permits complete flexibility in the specification of the
functional form of the uncompensated supply function.
A Change in the Parameter Vector from (W1, µ 1, σ 1) to (W1, µ 2, σ 1)9
First, our problem is to find compensating variation for a change in parameter vector from
(W1, µ 1, σ 1) to (W1, µ 2, σ 1)).  Let t denote an auxiliary variable such that 01 ≤≤ t , and let be µ (t)
be a differentiable function connecting µ 1 = µ (0) to µ 2 = µ (1).  Let h(t) • c(γ 1; W1, µ (t), σ 1;
EU
*(γ 1)).  That is, h(t) is compensating variation for a change in the parameter vector from (W1,
µ 1, σ 1) to (W1, µ (t), σ 1).  Then, differentiating this identity with respect to t, using (12), the
definition of compensated supply in (8), and the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus, we have the





∂ c γ 1;W1,µ t () ,σ 1;EU




≡ yc γ 1;W1,µ t () ,σ 1;EU








Note that in (15) µ (t) and dµ (t)/dt are known functions, and h(t) is an unknown function to be
found.  By noting that h(0) = 0 and integrating (15) with respect to t, we have:




∫ dt = y







The compensating variation for the change from µ 1 to µ 2, denoted by h(1), is the solution to (16)
when t = 1.
Next, we need to develop a practical method for calculating or approximating h(1).  For
any functional form of supply, equation (16) can be solved numerically.  Following Vartia (1983),
an algorithm that provides a numerical solution to (16) can be described intuitively as follows.  By
choosing numbers t1, t2, ... , tN+1 such that 0 = t1 < t2 <  ... < tN+1 = 1, we derive from (16) the
following equation:













Examining the sum of integrals in (17), when tk – tk-1 is small (that is, when N is large) we
can approximate y
*(W1 – h(t), µ (t), σ 1) by the mean of its values at the limits of the integral:
y
*(W1 – h(t), µ (t), σ 1) ª 0.5[y
*(W1 – h(tk-1), µ (tk-1), σ 1) + y
*(W1 – h(tk), µ (tk), σ 1)], resulting in,
(18)  y








* W1 − h(tk − 1),µ tk − 1 () ,σ 1 () + y








* W1 − h(tk − 1),µ tk− 1 () ,σ 1 () + y
* W1 − h(tk ),µ tk (),σ 1 () [] ⋅µ tk () − µ tk − 1 () [ ] .
Next, assume that µ (t) is linear:  µ (t) = µ 1 + t[µ 2 – µ 1], 0 ≤  t ≤  1. For a given integer N,
and for every k = 1, . . . , N + 1, let tk = (k - 1)/N.  To shorten the notation, let hk = h(tk) and let
yk
* = y
*(W1 – hk, µ (tk), σ 1) k = 1, . . .  , N.   First begin with starting values of µ (t1) = µ 1 and h1 =
0.  Then generate a sequence h2, . . . , hN+1 such that




* W1 − hk − 1,µ tk − 1 () ,σ 1 ()
y k −1
* ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
+ y
* W1 − hk ,µ tk () ,σ 1 ()
y k











⋅µ tk () − µ tk − 1 () [ ] .
Since the term hk appears on both sides of (19), it must be determined by an iterative method.  To
determine hk by iteration, define hk
(1) = hk-1, and for k = 2, . . . , N + 1, and m = 2, 3, . . . , let
(20) hk




* W1 − hk − 1,µ tk − 1 () ,σ 1 () + y
* W1 − hk
m − 1 () ,µ tk (),σ 1 () [] ⋅µ tk () − µ tk − 1 () [ ] .
As the number m increases, | hk
(m) – hk
(m-1) | will become negligibly small.  When at some number
Mk, | hk
(Mk) – hk





* W1 − hk − 1,µ tk− 1 () ,σ 1 () + y
* W1 − hk
M k () ,µ tk () ,σ 1 () [] ⋅µ tk () − µ tk − 1 () [ ] .
and start the calculation for k + 1.
Once the value of hk is approximated by this iterative method for k = 1, . . . , N + 1, the
compensating variation for the change from µ 1 to µ 2 can be approximated following (17) as,11
(22)cW 1,µ 1,σ 1;W1,µ 2 ,σ 1;EU
* γ 1 () () ≈
0.5 y
* W1 − hk − 1
Mk −1 () ,µ tk − 1 () ,σ 1 () + y
* W1 − hk




Letting N grow arbitrarily large allows (22) to provide an arbitrarily close approximation of
compensating variation.
A Change in the Parameter Vector from (W1, µ 1, σ 1) to (W2, µ 2, σ 2)
Now, we need to consider the more general case in which the whole parameter vector
changes from (W1, µ 1, σ 1) to (W2, µ 2, σ 2).  By assuming the existence of appropriate shutdown
mean prices, we have the formula for calculating compensating variation for the general parameter
change from (14):
(23)c µ 1,σ 1,W1
γ 1 ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
;µ 2 ,σ 2 ,W2
γ 2 ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
;EU












+ yc γ 1;W2 ,µ ,σ 1;EU
* γ 1 () ()
µ 1
µ
* W 2 ,σ 1,EU
* γ 1 () ()
∫ dµ
cW 2 ,µ 1,σ 1;W 2 ,µ
* W 2 ,σ 1,EU
* γ 1 () () ,σ 1;E U
* γ 1 () ()
￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
+ yc γ 1;W2 ,µ ,σ 2;EU
* γ 1 () ()
µ * W 2 ,σ 2 ,EU * γ 1 () ()
µ 2
∫ dµ
cW 2 ,µ * W 2,σ 2 ,EU * γ 1 () () ,σ 2 ; µ 2 ,σ 2 ,W2 ;E U * γ 1 () ()
￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
.
We can approximate the second integral on the right-hand side of (23) in a manner very
similar to (22), except that instead of finding compensating variation for a parameter change from
(W1, µ 1, σ 1) to (W1, µ 2, σ 1), we must find compensating variation for a parameter change from
(W2, µ 1, σ 1) to (W2, µ
*(W2, σ 1, EU*(γ 1)), σ 1).  While µ
*(W2, σ 1, EU*(γ 1)) is initially unknown, it
may be found to any desired degree of accuracy within the numerical algorithm;  it is the mean
output price µ  at which yc(γ 1; W2, µ , σ 1; EU*(γ 1)) = y*(W2 - c(γ 1; W2, µ , σ 1; EU*(γ 1)), µ , σ 1) = 0.
Similarly, the third integral on the right-hand side of (23) can be found numerically.12
Conclusions and Limitations
Our new procedure is quite flexible in that it can be used to approximate compensating
variation using any functional form of the uncompensated supply function and for changes in
higher moments of the output price distribution.  Similarly, with appropriate modifications, the
procedure can be used to calculate equivalent variation.  A limitation of our approach is that to
use it shutdown prices must exist.  This poses no problem when producers produce only one
product, for an output price of zero will always force a shutdown. As discussed in Pope, Chavas,
and Just, if a firm produces more than one good, even a zero price of one good may not cause the
producer to stop producing all goods and so shut down.  Additionally, it is usually the case that
there are no price-quantity observations in the data in the “shutdown price” neighborhood, which
causes standard deviations of estimates of vertical supply curve intercepts to be quite large.  Thus,
in a statistical sense, the confidence we can place in welfare measures that rely on accurate
estimation of the entire supply curve may be limited.13
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